Abstract-Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) is still an important security challenge for computer networks. Filterbased DDoS defense is considered as an effective approach, since it can defend against both victim-resourceconsumption attacks and link-congestion attacks. However, the high possibility of false positive and the huge consumption of router resources reduce the practicality of existing filter-based approaches. In order to solve this problem, we propose a new mechanism to efficiently eliminate the impact caused by DDoS attacks. We utilize the IP traceback results to obtain an attack graph that contains the candidate filtering routers. Taking the different filtering performance of the routers in the attack graph into consideration, we propose a filtering scheme to determine a small set of filtering routers that would increase filtering performance and reduce false positive. Simulation results based on real-world network topologies demonstrate that the proposed scheme can reduce the damage caused by DDoS attacks effectively and maintain the loss of normal traffic within an acceptable level.
I. INTRODUCTION
DDoS attacks have been one of the most hazardous threats to Internet. These attacks, which generate enormous packets by directing thousands of comprised hosts, can easily exhaust the computing and network resources of a victim. As an example, in August 2013, China's Internet was hit by a major distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack that briefly disrupted and slowed access to sites in the.cn domain [1] . For another instance, a large scale DDoS attack was launched on March 4th, 2011, which targeted about 40 major websites [2] in South Korea, which means that DDoS attacks are still prevalent in the current Internet.
Many counter measures have been developed to defeat DDoS attacks. According to the location of deployment, these measures can be classified into three categories: victim-end protection schemes, source-end protection schemes and intermediate-router protection schemes. A victim-end protection scheme can protect a victim from DDoS attack by blocking attack flows near the victim, but it is not able to defend flooding attacks aiming to consume network bandwidth. Source-end defense schemes are able to protect network bandwidth from being exhausted. However, in a large-scale DDOS attack, attack sources may include a large number of compromised hosts. The critical issue of this approach is how to deploy the schemes for the majority of end hosts since control and management of such schemes will be a huge burden [3] .
Consequently, intermediate routers should be the most effective locations to defend against both victim resource attacks and bandwidth flooding attacks [4, 5, 6, 15, 16] . Therefore, we need an approach that installs filters on intermediate filtering routers to block undesired network flows. A filter is a rule or a command which can be installed on a router to manage a specified attack flow. A filtering router is an intermediate router with built-in filters. A good intermediate-router-based DDoS defense scheme should provide solutions to the following problems: 1) how to effectively identify attack paths, 2) how to determine the optimal filtering routers, 3) how to reduce the loss of normal traffic.
To address these challenges, we propose a new DDoS defense scheme. In our scheme, routers employ a traceback method to identify which routers would forward the undesired flow. Moreover, by analyzing the attack graph and the filtering cost effective, we propose a genetic algorithm for determining the locations of filtering routers.
We found that most existing algorithms [4, 5, 6, 15, 16] combine the filtering function with the attack path identifying function in a high coupling degree. In other words, these filtering methods are relying on specific attack path identifying methods. The heavy burden on the routers brought by these specific attack path identifying algorithms makes the ISP reluctant to deploy these filtering system on the internet. However our proposed scheme decouples filtering functions from attack path identifying functions, which gives ISP more freedom in selecting the attack path identifying method.
In the aspect of defense ability, advantages and contributions of our scheme focus on the following aspects. The proposed scheme not only protects the victim's resources, but also protects the bandwidth of the bottleneck network link from being exhausted.
Our scheme can reduce the loss of normal traffic since the scheme filters with a lower percentage.
The scheme takes filtering resource consumption into consideration and makes use of each filtering router in an effective manner.
The structure of the paper is arranged as follows: the second section describes the related works. The third section presents the overall architecture of the system model. The fourth section describes the filtering router set determination scheme in detail. Experimental results are presented in Section V. In Section VI we carry out a discussion. Section VII summarizes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Many research works on router-based DDoS defense had been done in recent years [7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20] .
Router-based Packet Filtering (RPF) by Park and Lee [7] is based on the principle that for each link in the core of the Internet, there is only a limited set of source addresses from which traffic on the link could have originated. If an unexpected source address appears in an IP packet on a link, then it is assumed that the source address has been spoofed, and hence the packet should be filtered. DPF [8] , SAVE [9] and BASE [10] propose similar anti-spoofing mechanisms.
Capability-based defense approaches restrict the bandwidth of each sender. In SIFF [11] , the end-host classifies network traffic into privileged traffic and unprivileged traffic, then selectively filters individual flows so as to protect privileged traffic from DDoS attack. Yau et al. [12] also propose a feedback control scheme on the router to throttle the attacking traffic with max-min fairness. This scheme can proactively rate-limit the attack traffic before it reaches the victim, and therefore forestalls the DDoS attack.
Since Savage et al. [13] proposed the packet marking method for IP traceback, seveal DDoS defense methods based on path identification are proposed. Generally, these methods utilize routers to mark packets as they travel through the network. When a packet reaches an end-host, the end-host can take correspondent actions using the marking in it. PI [14] verifies an attack path by using TTL values in router markings and filtering the packets with the same markings at end-hosts. Minho Sung and Jun Xu [15] use a modified IP traceback method that moves the filtering location to intermediate routers. Dongwon Seo and Heejo Lee [16] modified a probabilistic packet marking method to propagate filtering locations.
III. SYSTEM WORK

A. Scenario Assumption
In this section, we make some assumptions on the attack scenario so as to design our system properly.
DDoS attack affects both the victim and the network link:
The victim is suffering from a DDoS attack with two major impacts. Firstly, the victim has limited resources for processing the incoming packets. The victim's resources, such as CPU and memory, will be exhausted, and then the victim will be unable to serve for normal traffic. Secondly, consumption of network bandwidth will result in legitimate flows being blocked.
Filtering resource is contained while serving large numbers of victims in need of protection: In order to maintain an acceptable throughput, the number of filters installed on a router should be contained yet enough to protect the victims whose number maybe very large.
Attack is detected first: The IDS (Intrusion Detection System) on the victim side monitors traffic patterns and can identify attack traffic. Nowadays, many servers have installed Host-based IDS for such a purpose.
Network topology can be obtained: The victims (with HIDS installed) should be able to obtain a map of upstream routers. This assumption is relatively stronger and will be explained in detail in section VI.
B. System Goals
In this section, we describe the goals of our work.
Identificating attack paths:
One feature of most DDoS attacks is the use of fork source IP addresses. For an intermediate-router-based filtering method, a victim should identify the path that the attack traffic traverses. But the stateless and non-authentication property of the routing network makes it difficult to locate the real sources and paths of network attacks. In our scheme, IP traceback methods are adopted to reconstruct the attack path. Intermediate routers are required to provide additional information for identifying attack paths.
Selecting optimal routers for installing filters: Filters should be installed on optimal routers in the network to obtain a good balance between filtering cost and packet transferring performance. There is a tradeoff between filtering cost and filtering efficiency. A good filter deployment scheme should provide a proper balance between victim protection, attack flow blocking and filtering resource conservation.
C. System Model
Our system is composed of three components: the Attack Path Reconstruction (APR) module, the Filteringrouter Set Determination (FSD) module and the Scheduled Packet Filtering (SPF) module. The relationship of these modules with the actual physical devices is shown in Fig 1. APR module. This model uses IP traceback schemes to reconstruct attack graphs. In our system, we prefer to use the PPM (Probabilistic Packet Marking) [13] method to achieve the goal because PPM is the most commonly used method for reconstructing DDoS attack paths. When packets are transferred in the network, each router needs to put a marking into certain IP header fields of the packets. Once identified as an attack packet, the marking of the packet will be used by the victim to reconstruct the attack path.
FSD module. This module runs on the victim and implements the following functions: (1) Analy-zing the attack graph consisting of all the detected attack paths. (2) Determining the set of routers that should install filters.
SPF module. This module is running on all the filtering-routers. The module mounts filters on the packet processing routine to block the specified packets. A selfadaptive filter manage-ment method is used here for filter rewinding. . When attack occurs, the APR module will use IP traceback method to reconstruct the attack graph. After that, the FSD module will recommend a proper set of filtering routers to block the attack. Furthermore, the SPF module can be used to un-mount the filters when disappearance of attack flows is detected so as to avoid filtering legitimate flows.
IV. MODULE DESIGN
In this section, we describe the design of the system modules in detail.
A. Design of APR Module
APR module adopts the PPM method for identifying attack paths. PPM is a well-known approach for IP traceback. In our work, we adjust some important parameters of the PPM method to make it more suitable for our scheme.
Each network router marks its unique information into the IP headers of outgoing packets with probability p. These markings collectively allow the victim to reconstruct the attack tree, which consists of the network edges that the packets sent from the attackers have traversed. Fig. 2 shows the format of the marking. When a packet arrives at a router, the router decides whether it will overwrite the current marking with probability p. If it decides to overwrite the marking, the distance field will be reset to zero. If the router decides to keep the marking, the distance field will simply increase by one.
This 17-bit marking can be placed in two IP header fields: the identification field plus an unused bit next to the DF (Don't Fragment) bit. Because this space, called the marking field, is too small for holding IP addresses representing a network edge, we need to adopt an encoding method here. There are many existing IP traceback schemes that use different encoding methods, among which we choose the Advanced Marking Scheme (AMS) proposed by Song and Perrig [17] . The advantage of AMS is that it can provide fast and accurate reconstruction of attack paths even if there is a large number of attackers. AMS requires the assumption that victims should know the upstream routers, as we have proposed in section III A.
AMS uses eight different hash functions H i (1≤i≤8) to encode network edges. When a packet goes through an edge e, i will be chosen randomly from 1 to 8 and H i (e) will be written in the IP header of the packet. When the victim begins to reconstruct the attack graph, whether an edge is on the attack path can be determined if and only if the victim has received at least k out of 8 values of { H i (e)| 1≤i≤8}. k can be 6 to 8. A larger k will improve the accuracy but will need more time for attack graph reconstruction.
We use AMS as the fundamental traceback scheme of our work. In [17] , simulation has been done to estimate the average number of packets, N, to be used for the victim to reconstruct an attack path. Results show that N is an approximate linear function of the length of the attack path, and it takes about 4000 packets to reconstruct a 30-hop attack path with marking probability q=0.04 and k=7. For a host attacking at 300kbps (i.e. sending 300 packets per second and the average size of a packet is 1 kilo-bits), it will take no more than 14 seconds to reconstruct the attack path, which is fast enough. Moreover, for our filtering scheme, we do not need to reconstruct such a long path. Our simulation shows that as long as most of the infected edges within 10 hops are reconstructed, our filtering scheme will achieve our goal.
B. Design of FSD Module
FSD module runs on the victim. Once the attack graph is reconstructed by the ARP module, the FSD module uses the attack graph to determine the set of appropriate routers and installs filters on them. This task is executed periodically after a DDoS attack has been detected.
The challenge here is how to determine the optimal filtering routers. If we simply select the nearest router to every attack source as a filtering router, we can block all attack flows. However, as we have emphasized in section II, in a large-scale DDoS attack, attack sources may consist of millions of compromised hosts, thus installing filters on all the routers will consume too much filtering and communication resources. We will benefit from carefully selecting a relatively small set of routers for filtering.
In this section we deduce the formulas to evaluate the cost and performance of filtering routers and put forward a genetic-based algorithm to determine the set of filtering routers for defense.
1) Modeling
We propose an attack model to describe the current attack graph. Consider an attack whose target is a node, v, which refers to the victim. An attack source is referred to as the router that is nearest to the attack host. The set of attack sources will be referred to as A. An attack event can be represented by (A, v). For each attack nodes a i in A,  P(a i, v) represents the attack path of a i, which consists of a sorted list of router nodes from a i to v. An attack graph can be denoted by AG(A, v)，which is a tree with v as the root and consists of all the attack paths from all attack sources.
For example, in Fig. 3 , we demonstrate a simplified network in which a victim is under attack. There are five attack sources: a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 and a 5 . The attack path from a 4 is (a 4 , r 4 , r 8 , r 12 , r 14 , victim), and AG(A, v) is presented with dotted lines.
S represents the set of filtering routers in the graph. Given a particular attack event (A, v), S can be partitioned into two subsets: the positive nodes and the negative nodes. The positive nodes are on the attack graph of (A, v) while the negative nodes are not. For a given set of filtering routers S and the attackers A, we denote the collection of filter nodes associated with an attack event as FG (A, v) . The problem to solve in our scheme is how to choose a set of co-operative filtering nodes that is distributed in the network. We denote the selected set of co-operative filtering nodes as BS(A, v) (i.e. the set of filtering routers for blocking attack flows). Obviously, any selected BS must be a subset of FG(A, v). 
2) Cost and Performace Evaluation
We observed that different filter nodes can play different roles in achieving the goal. For example, in Fig.  3 , r 1 and r 11 are both filtering routers on the same attack path P(a 11 , v) . If we install filters on r 11 , two links (i.e. r 11 -r 14 and r 14 -victim ) will be protected from the attack flow, thus reducing the possibility of congestion on these links. However, if we install filters on r 1 instead, two more edges (i.e. r 1 -r 6 and r 6 -r 11 ) will be protected, thus strengthening the protection. For another example, r 2 and r 7 are both on the attack path P(a 2 ,v) . r 3 and r 7 are both on the attack path P(a 3, v) . If we want to block both attack flows with the least number of filtering routers, r 7 rather than r 2 and r 3 should be a better choice. In order to choose the right BS for blocking attack flows, it is important to find a way to estimate the filtering performance of each filtering router on the attack graph. The following are two desirable characteristics that should be taken into consideration.
Attack Flow Blocked Percentage (AFBP) This metric refers to the percentage of attack flows a filtering router can block. In Fig. 3 , there are five attack flows detected in the attack graph and r 12 can block three of them. Thus the AFBP of r 12 is 60%. We use equation (1) to calculate the AFBP value of a filtering router.
Link Protection Percentage (LPP) In some situations, the attacker will use a lot of useless messages to exhaust transmission resources in order to force the victim host to lose the ability to provide services. Therefore, link bandwidth protection is another goal of our scheme. It is not easy to evaluate the effect of DDoS attacks on bandwidth. To achieve quantization, we denote a unit of bandwidth damage as one attack flow occupying one link. For example, in Fig. 3 , the attacker a 1 causes five units of damage because the attack flow from a 1 has occupied five links. By gathering the bandwidth damage of all the attackers, the damage of an attack event (donate as D) can be calculated in whole. We use LPP to measure a filtering node's capability for protecting link resources, as shown in equation (2) . Dist(x, y, P) denotes the number of links between node x and node y on the attack path P. D denotes the original attacking damage before installing the filters. 
It is worth noticing that once we are allowed to choose more than one filter nodes, different nodes may affect each other on filtering performance. For example, in Fig.  3 , if we have chosen r 1 as a filtering router, r 6 would lose half of its original filtering performance because the attack flow would have been forestalled by r 1. For this reason, the determination of BS is not a simple scoreranking problem. For evaluating the performance of BS, We should think of the nodes in BS as one atomic unit when estimating their total performance metrics. In equation (3), we define a new metric with BS as the parameter
While we can use equation (3) to evaluate the performance of a BS, our scheme still needs a method to estimate the cost of BS. Firstly, we should evaluate the cost of router resources including memory resources and computing resources that are used for filtering. This cost is proportional to the number of filtering routers used.
The number of nodes included in BS is denoted as NF(BS), and this value can be used to evaluate the filtering resource cost. Secondly, the possible loss of legitimate flows should be calculated. When an attack flow is blocked by a filtering node, legitimate flows that take the same path towards the victim may also be filtered. The filtering of legitimate flows is considered as false positive. False positive reflects the adverse effect of BS on legitimate network flows. Since we do not know the distribution of legitimate flows, designing a targetoriented real-time measurement of false positive is impossible. However, in the Internet, routing algorithms tends to choose the shortest paths between the sources and the destinations as the routing paths. By gathering all the shortest paths leading from every end hosts to the victim, we can obtain the percentage of the paths blocked by BS. We denote this percentage as PCPV (Percentage of Convergence of Paths to Victim), and use this value to evaluate the influence of false positive introduced by BS. For example, in Fig. 4 , all of the ten shortest paths are depicted with dotted lines. If r 11 and r 8 are chosen as the filtering routers, only four of the paths are blocked, with the remaining six still available for communication. That is to say, despite the influence of false positive, the victim still has the ability to provide services to a certain percentage of end hosts. That is where PCPV makes sense. We use Algorithm 5 to calculate the PCPV value. SP(a, v) refers to the set of nodes on the shortest path leading from a to v. H refers to the set of end hosts on the attack graph. NSP refers to the number of shortest paths leading to the victim. To summarize, we evaluate the filtering performance with two metrics: AFBP(BS) for victim protection and LPP(BS) for link resource protection. NF(BS) and PCPV(BS) are metrics for evaluating filtering costs. We derive the ultimate mathematical formula for calculating the filtering performance of BS in equation (6) and use CP(BS) to denote the effectiveness of installing filters in BS. The formula allows for tradeoff between AFBP and LPP, and the filtering cost metrics are contained by NF and PCPV. We will present an evaluation of (To summarize, we evaluate the filtering performance with two metrics: AFBP(BS) for victim protection and LPP(BS) for link resource protection. NF(BS) and PCPV(BS) are metrics for evaluating filtering costs. We derive the ultimate mathematical formula for calculating the filtering performance of BS in equation (6) and use CP(BS) to denote the effectiveness of installing filters in BS. The formula allows for tradeoff between AFBP and LPP, and the filtering cost metrics are contained by NF and PCPV. We will present an evaluation of (α, X, Y) in section V.
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3) BS Determination Algrithm
The ultimate goal is to determine the BS with the highest CP value. We have put forward the equation to evaluate BS, but still do not known how to determine BS. In this section, we will put forward a genetic-based algorithm to solve the problem.
Genetic algorithm introduction A genetic algorithm is a heuristic search algorithm that mimics the process of natural evolution. The basic principles of the genetic algorithm were laid down by Holland [18] , and have been proved useful in a variety of search and optimization problems. Genetic algorithm simulates the survival-of-the-fittest principle of nature. The principle provides an organizational reproductive framework: starting from an initial population, proceeding through some random selection, crossover and mutation operators from generation to generation, and converging to a group of best environment-adapting individuals.
The selection operator is applied to the current generation to pick up some individuals in probability P s and copy them to an intermediate generation.
The crossover operator takes two individuals from the current generation, and recombines the two individuals with a probability Pc to create the individuals of the intermediate generation. The single point crossover method cuts the two individuals' encoding strings at a chosen position, and swaps the tail segments of the two strings.
The mutation operator chooses an individual from the current generation, and alters one bit in the individual's encoding string with a low probability Pm, then puts it in the intermediate generation.
Individuals of the intermediate generation will be evaluated with a fitness function that decides whether to put them in the next generation. After some rounds of iterations, the final generation is obtained, in which the fittest individuals will be kept. Finally, the algorithm will return the best individuals as the solution for the problem.
Algorithm definition
We find that in some special cases, the BS determination problem can be solved by efficient greedy-based algorithms. For example, we can evaluate every node in BS separately, and select a set of nodes with high CP values. But this kind of greedy-based method will probably end up with a local optimal solution because different nodes may affect each other's CP values. Genetic algorithm has strong global search capability. We can incorporate greedy methods into the initialization step of genetic algorithm. The algorithm will provide more accurate near-optimal solutions with higher speed.
Since every node in BS is selected from FG, we can encode each node in FG(A, v) into a single bit, with 1 representing filters to be installed on this node and 0 representing filters not to be installed. In this way, each selection of BS can be encoded into a N-bit binary number, where N is the number of nodes in FG(A, v) . We use equation (6) to evaluate the level of fitness. The details of the algorithm is shown in Fig. 5 . Steps 1 to 4 are initializations for parameters and the solution for the node set determination problem.
Step 5 is used to check whether the termination condition of the iterations is met or not. The greedy-based crossover and mutation operations are performed in this iteration block to produce individuals of the next generation. Let us see the two operations in detail. Steps 7 to 17 are the crossover operations. The key idea is that when the crossover operation produces better individuals, the better individuals are accepted. Otherwise, we will accept newly generated individuals as candidates for the next generation. Steps 18 to 28 are mutation operations. Steps 29 to 32 update the solution and the generation number.
C. Design of SPF Module
In our scheme, the SPF module is running on filtering routers. Once the SPF module receives a filtering request from a victim, it installs a filter to block the attack flow.
Routers in the Internet have limited resources for filtering, while a router may receive many filtering requests from one or more victims. A filter should be weeded out once such attack flows tend to disappear after a certain period of time. The SPF module is used for such kind of filter management.
How does SPF determine whether a filter should be kept or weeded out? Two factors should be taken into consideration. Firstly, the installation time is an important factor. We should hold up for filters that are installed not long ago. Secondly, the frequency of a filter being used is also a critical factor. We should give an integrated measurement of both factors. Such measurement can be scored using equation (7).
in which T denotes the weight of the filter installation time and F is the weight of the frequency by which filter I is used. tc denotes the current time and td denotes the filter installation time. m denotes how many times the filter is used. The scores of filters should be computed and logged periodically. Filters whose scores are below a threshold should be weeded out.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Simulations have been conducted on three network topologies to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme. The topology data is from CAIDA [19] and all the attack paths are routes starting from a single victim to multiple attackers. For performance evaluation purpose, we assume that each legitimate user sends packets at the rate of 1 unit per second and all the attackers attacks at the same rate. Table 1 shows the performance metrics and control parameters used in our simulation. The bad traffic drop percentage (BDP) is the dropping rate of the attack traffic. The value of BDP can be obtained by calculating traffic statistics at the victim. Link Protected Percentage (LPP), which we have put forward in section VI, is used to evaluate the protection for link resources. Among the control parameters, g represents the percentage of illegitimate incoming traffic, α, X and Y are impact factors in equation (6) . 
A. Metrics to Evaluate
B. Simulation Results
Fig . 6 shows the BDP as a function of X. α is set to 1 to maximize the protection for the victim resource. Y is set to 20. There are two curves in the figure, corresponding to two different values of g (g = 0.05 and g = 0.1). In other words, the number of attackers will be 5% and 10% of the total end hosts. The comparison of the two curves indicates that the scheme's performance is related to the percentage of attackers. The scheme will work better under the scenario where the distribution of attacking sources is not very wide. Recall that X represents the impact factor determined by the victim's tolerance of false positive. Both curves indicate that there will be an improvement on BDP when X increases. That is to say, there is a tradeoff between protection for victims and the severity of false positive. Fig. 7 shows how the BDP changes as the parameter Y varies. Y represents the max number of filtering routers a victim can use. The curves indicate that BDP increases when more routers are used for filtering. Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 reflect protection for link resources, and we can see that the curves have a similar changing trend.
VI. DISCUSSIONS
A. Mapping Upstream Routers
In previous sections, we declared that our scheme rely on the assumption that the victim has a map of the upstream routers. In this subsection, we will demonstrate that this assumption is reasonable and practical.
Many tools can be used for mapping. CAIDA's skitter is the most persevering measurement project, which can map routers from the victim to a large set of selected destinations. Rocketfuel [21] is another available choice. It is easy to get a map of upstream routers using these tools. We can also use itrace [22] in our application. By collecting itrace packets we can construct the upstream map.
It is difficult to obtain an updated accurate Internet topology. However, since our goal is not to get the exact attackers, such a map does not have to be perfect. Moreover, the attack graph itself is a good tool for mapping upstream routers.
B. Potential Applications of the Proposed Scheme
A significant hurdle for DDoS defense may be the lack of viable economic incentives. Installing filters in a domain consumes valuable router resources and reduces the overall routing performance. Moreover, its beneficiaries are likely to be other domains rather than the domain performing filtering. With our scheme, the economic model can be built as follows: victims can be charged for the filtering services provided by an ISP. The payment may depend on the number of filtering routers being used and the number of attack packets to be filtered.
Differentiated qualities in services can also be provided by our scheme, as the impact factors in equation (6) can be adjusted according to the payment. For example, if the victim has paid for a higher service quality, more filters can be used to improve the filtering effect.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents an IP-traceback-based packet filtering scheme against DDoS attack. It utilizes the attack graph obtained through IP traceback to evaluate the cost and the performance of filtering routers and deploy filters accordingly on the proper routers. The simulation results demonstrate that the scheme is very effective in protecting the victim's resources as well as the link resources, yet keeping filtering resource consumption and loss of normal traffic within a proper limit.
